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Abstract
The OSGi platform is designed to make Java soft-
ware extensible at runtime. This undeniably presents
a great interest in several domains like embedded plat-
forms or enterprise application servers. However, se-
curing the deployment of the OSGi components, or
bundles, proves to be a major challenge. The current
approach consists in digitally signing the bundles and
certifying the signature through a Public Key Infras-
tructure.
We propose to replace this technology with Identity-
based cryptographic mechanisms, which provide both
better performances and simplified key management.
We present an infrastructure for initialization and use
of Identity-based key management, and define the dig-
ital signature of bundles using such a cryptographic
scheme. Based on our implementation, we provide
a comparison between PKI management and Identity-
based Key Management. The proposed approach proves
to support radical improvement in the key management
process, especially in strongly asymmetric system such
as OSGi-based Home Gateway, where a few providers
publish services for millions of potential users.
Introduction
Nowadays, the ever-growing connection to Internet
of homes and enterprises - often through a connection
over ADSL Wide-band Access - brings new capabilities
for home entertainments or professional services. The
Home Gateway which classically provides the connec-
tion to Internet becomes a central device that supports
execution of high-level services. These services need
to be dynamically loaded on the gateway at runtime,
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which is supported by the OSGi Platform. The OSGi
environment is a lightweight overlay to a Java Virtual
Machine. This runtime extension enables new code to
be executed on the Home Gateway, and must there-
fore be strongly protected. This protection is currently
performed through the digital signature of the bun-
dles with DSA algorithms, which imply a complex key
management. We propose to replace DSA signature
with digital signatures that use Identity-based Cryp-
tography. This recent cryptographic scheme enables in
particular to dramatically simplify the management of
public key, by replacing Public Key Certificates with
a string identifier of the signer. A parameter which
is specific to the Certification Authority enables ev-
ery client to deduce to public key from the identifier,
and thus to check whether the Certification Authority,
called Private Key Generator (PKG) has used a valid
private key for the bundle signer.
We present in this paper other works related to se-
cure OSGi and dynamic systems in Section 1, and the
principle of Identity-Based Cryptography, in Section 2.
The infrastructure for secure deployment of OSGi bun-
dles is presented in the section 3. We then provide a
validation of the proposed approach in Section 4, and
conclude the paper.
1 Related Works
The security of the component deployment process
is enforced is most cases through context-dependent
solutions. We provide here an overview of the principal
existing solutions.
The default Bundle Signature mechanisms of de-
ployment of OSGi bundles is based on the Java Archive
signature [16]. It is strengthened by the OSGi Core
Specification Release 4 [11] to provide a higher level
of security in the deployment process. In particular,
OSGi bundles can not be extended with new resources,
when Java Archives can [13]. You can find further tech-
nical information related to digital signature of OSGi
bundles in [12].
Several alternatives to the OSGi platform have been
proposed to support this secure deployment. The Cin-
gal Model [3] manages the deployment of components
through insertion of metadata in the components. The
bundles are wired together. Each bundle carries au-
thentication metadata, which comprises the digital sig-
nature and the identity of the signer. The implementa-
tion is not compatible with the OSGi framework, but
the principles are very similar. Another alternative is
Preatoria [5] which is a framework dedicated to the
deployment of Web Services. The security mechanisms
are based on the Web-Service standards, which enables
to support both deployment and execution time se-
curity. Praetoria is developed on the .Net platform.
Since it uses Web Service technology, it is less flexible
than the OSGi platform. In the context of enterprise
systems, the SmartFrog (Smart Framework for Object
Groups) [9] has been developed. The security is per-
formed through the encryption of all communications
and data transfer. This approach is straightforward
in environments where all entities are known, but can
not be easily mapped toward large-scale or evolutive
systems.
Some solutions are specifically target at the OSGi
framework. For instance, Kim et al. propose to rely on
Message Authentication Code (MAC) based authenti-
cation. Consequently, the asymmetric cryptography-
based signature with SHA-1 and DSA algorithms is
replaced by symmetric cryptography. The creation of
a shared secret at bootstrap time is required [7]. This
process is more lightweight that the one specified by
the OSGi Alliance. However, the use of symmetric
cryptography makes the key management more com-
plex and less robust: since the secret key is shared,
the non-repudiation of actions can not be guaranteed,
keys can be divulgated to third parties, and key re-
vocation is extremely difficult to support. Moreover,
the actual benefit is not quantified, which would be of
a great interest when choosing to give up the current
standard. This work is extended by Lim et al. to take
advantage of XML technology signature, that supports
MAC based authentication [8]. Since XML is usually
not considered as a lightweight technology, this exten-
sion seems paradoxical with the use of limited resource
devices. Again, the lack of quantification of the relative
performances of the various solutions does not provide
sufficient data to choose between the various solutions.
Identity-based Cryptography has not yet been ap-
plied to the deployment of OSGi bundles - or other
kind of components. However, several propositions
have been made to exploit their possibilities in the
context of distributed and pervasive systems. In the
context of Health-Care systems - which are a potential
applications for Home Gateways - Mont propose to use
IB Cryptography to support a secure messaging ser-
vice [10]. The authors take advantage of the increased
flexibility brought by IB Cryptography to enforce role-
based security mechanisms. The technology has also
been used in the context of the Grid to provide secure
communication channels [15].
2 Identity-Based Cryptosystems
Until recently, encryption techniques have relied on
long, randomly generated keys that must be mapped
to identities using digitally-signed documents, called
certificates. The management of these certificates, and
the need to fetch a certificate before encrypting to a
person or machine, has made encryption very difficult.
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) takes a completely
new approach to the problem of encryption: IBE is a
key authentication system in which the public key of a
user is some unique information about the identity of
the user . That allows any party to generate a pub-
lic key from a known identity value such as an ASCII
string (e.g. a user’s email address) enabling data to be
protected without the need for certificates. A trusted
third party, called the Private Key Generator (PKG),
generates the corresponding private keys. Each new
user associated to the trusted domain must requests
his private key from this PKG. The master key is kept
secret by the PKG and there is no authority in charge
of the generation of this master key. The PKG controls
the mapping of identities to decryption keys in order
to ensure the protection of the system.
Historically, the design of a functional Identity-
Based Cryptosystem (IBC) was a long-standing open
problem in cryptography. The notion of IBC was first
introduced by A. Shamir [14] in 1984. In 2001, D.
Boneh and M. Franklin [1] were the first to propose a
fully adapted model with the help of elliptic curves and
the Weil and Tate bilinear pairings serving as building
blocks for these Public Key Cryptosystems (PKC).
As a result, parties may encrypt messages (or ver-
ify signatures) with no prior distribution of keys be-
tween individual participants. This is extremely useful
in cases where pre-distribution of authenticated keys
is inconvenient or infeasible due to technical restraints.
However, to decrypt or sign messages, the authorized
user must obtain the appropriate private key from the
PKG. A caveat of this approach is that the PKG must
be highly trusted, as it is capable of generating any
user’s private key and may therefore decrypt (or sign)
messages without authorization. Because any user’s
private key can be generated through the use of the
third party’s secret, this system has inherent key es-
crow.
The power of IBE is in its simplicity. By using
well-known identifiers, such as email addresses, as pub-
lic keys, IBE enables security policies to be encoded
directly into encryption and authentication methods,
eliminating the need for cumbersome certificates and
Certification Authorities. By eliminating the need for
certificates, IBE removes the hurdles of PKI: certificate
lookup, life-cycle management, Certificate Revocation
Lists, and cross-certification issues. IBE’s simplicity
also enables it to be used in ways PKI could not: IBE
can be used to build security systems that are more
dynamic, lightweight and scalable. The IBC based on
elliptic curves have numerous advantages as the gain in
size of the keys and the reduced computational time.
Moreover, they provide as well signature/verification
processes as encryption/decryption operations within
correct times and for a lower cost of CPU or memory
usage than in the case of classical cryptography (as
DSA).
We propose thus to utilize IBC to deploy bundle
in the OSGi context with a high level of security in
parallel. We claim that the resulting protocol is more
lightweight in both cost of management and network
communications than usual PKC based on traditional
cryptographic tools (RSA, DSA). To prevent the natu-
ral key escrow problem presents in the native IBE sys-
tem since the PKG knows each private key, we decide to
use the Chang-Zeng-Kim signature scheme which pro-
vides a solution to this issue. To support our proposi-
tion, we intend to implement a fully functional version
of our protocol. The performance of our protocol is
comparable to the performance of ElGamal signature
scheme. The security of the system is based on a nat-
ural analog Extract, Sign and Verify. Considering Alice
a signer with her identity d, she signs a message in the
Sign phase by using the private key given by the PKG.
In the Verify phase, Bob verifies the validity of her sig-
nature in an IBS scheme just by using her identity IDA
and the params made publicly available by the PKG.
The Chen-Zhang-Kim’s Identity-based Signature
(CZK-IBS) scheme (see [2] for more details about this
scheme) is used in the signing and verification phases
in order to eliminate the inherent Key Escrow prob-
lem as cited in Introduction. This choice is highly mo-
tivated by some non-repudiation considerations espe-
cially in the context an multi-provider and open envi-
ronment as the OSGi platform. Another motivation for
this scheme is to help the public bundle deployment.
Rather than storing a big database of public keys the
Figure 1. Global view of the initialization of
the cryptographic Objects
system can either derive these public keys from a local
file or from authorized providers.
3 The OSGi Security Architecture with
CZK-IBS
The substitution of the classical Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI) with an Identity-based key man-
agement infrastructure for securing the deployment of
OSGi bundles has two main advantages. First, the
process of key management is greatly simplified, which
makes the actual use of secure deployment more realis-
tic than with a PKI [4]. Secondly, the specifications of
this new deployment scheme provides a support to ex-
tend the original functionalities with the confidential-
ity of the bundles. Three phases need to be specified
for the deployment of CZK-IBS signed bundles: the
initialization of the cryptographic objects, the process
of bundle deployment, and the mechanisms of bundle
signature.
3.1 Initialization
Initialization of the cryptographic objects in our in-
frastructure is shown in the figure 1. The process is
the following.
First, all entities that need to be identified must be
initialized. The parameters of the trusted PKG which
performs the management of cryptographic objects in
our infrastructure must be distributed through a secure
channel to all participants, along with their own unique
identifier. This is typically done offline. In the context
of telecommunication services such as those developed
in the Muse Project, the PKG is located on the Access
Control Server. The identifier delivered to the partici-
pants of the system contains the following information:
a unique string identifier. The PKG stores a copy of
the public identities to be able to identify valid par-
ticipants. This offline initialization of cryptographic
objects is typically done through a USB key or a smart
card where the specified informations are stored. This
pre-identification step is mandatory in closed systems,
such as Home Services, monitoring systems, or enter-
prise informations systems. It can be by-passed in open
systems such as the deployment of open source software
or in ambient systems, where all actors that want to
take advantage of the infrastructure should be allowed
to. While allowing unknown entities to be identified,
such an approach guarantees the uniqueness of the bun-
dle providers, and thus prevents both the tampering of
the bundles and the impersonation of the providers.
Secondly, the bundles Issuers retrieve their private
key from the PKG. Therefore, the PKG is implicitly
granted a strong trust, since it could forge any pri-
vate key of all entities that rely on it. Nevertheless,
the CZK-IBS provides a tracing scheme to detect the
PKG’s impersonation. The retrieval of the private key
must be performed again when the issued private key is
expired. Typically the span-life of a private key would
be a short period of time, such as a day or a week. This
short validity of time of the private key makes the re-
vocation of the issuers a lightweight process, since it is
sufficient not to issue a new private key for them.
Thirdly, the client platforms are initialized. A client
needs two types of data so as to subsequently check the
validity of the bundles it loads. The first type, the so-
called ‘params’ of the PKG must be known. They allow
to compute the public key of each bundle issuer from
their identity and above all, to verify the signature of
the signed bundles. The second type of data is a list
of trusted bundle issuers that are considered as valid
must also be available. Otherwise, it would be possible
for any malicious issuers to sign and publish bundles
that would be considered as valid.
3.2 Bundle Deployment with CZK-IBS
The process of deployment with CZK-IBS scheme is
shown in the Figure 2. It is very similar to the one in
the context of a classical PKI, with a notable gain in
term of management complexity.
The signature phase is similar to the signature mech-
anism in the PKI based model. The differences lay in
the cryptographic algorithms that are used (see section
3.3) and the frequency of the update of the private key
of the signers. The validation phase is done in the same
Figure 2. Secure Deployment of OSGi Bun-
dles with CZK-IBS scheme
way as in the case of the PKI. The validation process
must be adapted to the algorithms. The validation of
the public key certificate is replaced by the control of
the validity of the identity of the signer: its identity is
compared against the list of valid signers that has been
obtained during the initialization phase.
The confidentiality is achieved by encrypting the
bundles before their publication. Because it is not pos-
sible to publish a signed bundle for all clients, groups
must be defined that gather the client platforms with
similar functional and trust profiles. The clients re-
trieve the private key of their group through a request
to the PKG. Consequently, this latter must maintain a
list of the users’ identities for each group. The with-
drawal of clients from the group is dealt with by a reg-
ular key update. Former group members can not have
access to the new keys. The total number of groups
should be reduced, so as to limit the number of copies
of a single bundle that are encrypted with different
public keys. Moreover, the user authentication mecha-
nism is also based on its identity.
3.3 Bundle Signature with CZK-IBS
The process of signing bundles is pretty similar to
the classical one [12]. The algorithms used for obtain-
ing the hash values are the same but those generat-
ing the digital signature are different. Into the bar-
gain, the absence of a public key certificate makes the
CMS format [6] obsolete. The structure of a signed
bundle using CZK-IBS scheme is depicted in the fig-
ure 3. Each resource of the archive is identified in the
META-INF/MANIFEST.MF file, along with its
hash value. So as to allow several signers to sign the
bundle, the hash value of this Manifest file is stored in
a so-called Signature File, as well as the hash value of
the various entries of the Manifest. The digital signa-
ture itself is realized on the Signature File, and stored
Figure 3. Structure of a signed bundle, using
Identity-based Cryptography
in the Signature Block.
We propose to replace the CMS compliant Signa-
ture Block by an IB-CMS compliant block, that is
to say a modified CMS file that contains the informa-
tion related to the signer, such as its identifier, and the
properties of its key, such as the period of validity. The
signer informations are the following: the signer iden-
tifier (‘signerID’), the identifier of the PKG that issues
the private key (‘keyissuerID’), the date of the emis-
sion of the key (with the year, the month, the day),
the validity period of the key (an integer value, and
a time unit, which can be day, week, month or year),
and the name of the algorithms that are bound to this
key. The encryption algorithm is mandatory. In most
case, the hash algorithm is bound to the encryption al-
gorithm, and must be specified. The CZK-IBS scheme
is also integrated in the IB-CMS file. Since it is based
on Elliptic curve cryptography, it is more performant
and more compact that the classical DSA one. Two
fields are removed from the original specified format,
because they make no sense in the context of IBC: the
X.509 public key certificate (or list of certificate, if del-
egation of signature was provided), and the Certificate
Revocation List (CRL). Consequently, the IB-CMS file
is more lightweight than the CMS one was, which can
be a useful property in environments with limited re-
sources.
The substitution of classical PKI-based asymmetric
cryptography by the Identity-based scheme makes it
possible to build an infrastructure for secure deploy-
ment of bundles that is both easier to manage, and
less greedy in term of resource consumption. We claim
that these two properties not only bring an improve-
ment to the current specified solution, but also that it
merely makes it a realistic choice for systems that are
both complex and limited in their resources.
3.4 Security Analysis
We present in this section a short security analy-
sis of our infrastructure against some classical attacks.
The basic security properties a cryptosystem should
provide are Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication,
and Non-repudiation. Confidentiality is keeping infor-
mation secret from all other than those who are au-
thorized to see it. Integrity is ensuring that the infor-
mation has not been altered by unauthorized or un-
known entities. Authentication is the assurance that
the communicating party is the one that it claims to
be. Non-repudiation is preventing the denial of pre-
vious commitments or actions. The security of each
cryptographic primitive used in our proposition was
discussed in the referenced paper [2] and was clearly
established. Although the first IBC security notions
were proposed in [1], there is no work yet aiming at
establishing the strength of this notion in a full secu-
rity analysis. So far, only the indistinguishability based
security notions, as well as their variations have been
considerated in the literature.
Digital Signature is a fundamental cryptographic
primitive which provides authentication, integrity and
non-repudiation. The unforgeability of the hashed mes-
sage guarantees the integrity of the CZK-IBS Signa-
ture. This property is provided by the collision resis-
tant property of the hash function used. Due to recent
results published in [17], at least SHA-1 must be used
to be sure that the hash function does not permit to
compromise the bundle signature integrity.
In our proposition, the PKG plays an important role
by defining entirely the security domain and thus may
potentially forge signature for any message. Neverthe-
less, the CZK-IBS scheme provides a way to circum-
scribe this problem. The dishonesty of the PKG can
be proved by the Service Issuer by providing a proof of
his secret key (SIDA , r) through a knowledge challenge.
So there is Authentication in the system.
The PKG also plays an important role by ensur-
ing that all the valid Service Issuers are trustworthy.
Actually, the Service Provider in an OSGi based Ser-
vice Environment exists outside the home network as
does the Home Gateway manager for managing the
home gateway and authenticating the users. Our pro-
tocol is designed under the assumption that Identity-
based Infrastructure is used according to Home Gate-
ways storage and computation capabilities, the params
are shared between all entities. Another assumption is
that the service users trust the Service Manager. Fi-
nally, Home Gateway knows that the PKG is legitimate
by using its public key initialized in a preinstallation
phase.
4 Validation
The validation of our approach is performed in two
steps. First, we present the technology that we use to
develop our prototype. Then we perform an qualitative
and quantitative evaluation of the benefits of Identity-
based cryptography in the process of secure deployment
for OSGi Bundles.
4.1 Implementation
A prototype for IB Cryptography systems is cur-
rently being built at the CITI Laboratory. It will be
integrated with the SFelix suite we previously devel-
oped1, which is an implementation of current OSGi
Release 4 specifications of Bundle Signature.
The SFelix suite is written in Java, to be fully com-
pliant with the OSGi environment. However, cur-
rent implementations of identity-based cryptography
libraries, Miracl and Voltage, are only available in C.
This does not prevent experimentation, since call to
native libraries are well supported in Java, but limits
the portability of the solution.
We now discuss the existing IB cryptographic li-
braries. The first implementation is based on Miracl
which is a portable C/C++ library providing a full
implementation of Multiprecision Arithmetic. In par-
ticular it includes all the primitives necessary to im-
plement Number Theoretic based methods for Public
Key Cryptography, such as Diffie-Hellman, RSA and
DSS. Complete support is also provided for implemen-
tation of Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems over the fields
GF(2m) and GF(p). The MIRACL big number library
also contains an experimental implementation of IBE2.
The second implementation is based on Voltage IBE
Toolkit which is a set of tools that enable developers
to quickly and easily incorporate Identity-Based En-
cryption into their applications. Using the Voltage IBE
Toolkit, applications can seamlessly integrate with the
Voltage Security platform and take advantage of its
centralized administration, advanced policy manage-
ment, and key distribution architecture3.
Our IB-based digital signature tools are in their
early development stage. However, this does not pre-
vent us to perform a precise evaluation of the proposed
framework.
1http://sfelix.gforge.inria.fr/
2http://www.shamus.ie/
3http://developer.voltage.com
4.2 Benefits for Security Management
The prototype we develop allows us to evaluate the
actual benefits of Identity-Based Cryptography in the
process of deploying OSGi Bundles. This evaluation
makes it possible both to confirm that Identity-Based
Cryptography hold its promises, and to draw actual
pros and cons of classical PKI-based systems and IB-
Crypto based systems.
A systematic comparison between Classical PKI and
Identity-Based Cryptography PKI is given in Table 1.
The first main difference, which is the ground if the
simplicity of management of IB-PKI systems, is that
the public key must be disseminated as is in the context
of classical PKI, and that it is directly deduced from a
string identifier and from a Private Key Generator spe-
cific parameter with IB-Cryptography. Consequently,
keys are updated using huge periods in classical PKI,
whereas they can be updated daily with IB-Crypto:
if a time stamp is appended to the signer’s identifier
to generate the public key, this latter can be updated
daily. The client only needs to re-generate locally the
new public key. The benefit of regular key update is
that public key revocation is performed transparently.
When a signer is no longer part of the system, she can
not retrieve a new daily key pair from the PKG. So she
can no longer sign bundles. On the contrary, classical
PKI infrastructures imply that the client must be noti-
fied when a signer is revoked, and thus complex Public
Key Revocation mechanisms must be available. More-
over, Key size and time for signature verification are
decreased with IB-Cryptography.
PKI based on RSA or DSA algorithms still have ad-
vantages over Identity-based Cryptography. In partic-
ular, the speed of signature generation is greater using
DSA or RSA algorithms. But the main drawback of
Identity-Based Cryptography is that the Private Key
Generator must be fully trusted, since he knows the
private key of all entities of the systems. Whereas clas-
sical PKIs are based on the certification of public keys:
they validate this latter without having access to the
private key. Thus, the Certification Authority requires
a lower trust level than PKGs. We solve this prob-
lem by using the IB-CKS cryptographic scheme, which
makes key escrow traceable, and therefore forces the
PKG to be honest.
A quantitative analysis shows that Digital Signature
of Bundles using IB Cryptography provides a great en-
hancement in key management overhead when com-
pared to PKI infrastructure. When a new key is used
by a signer, this latter makes a communication with
the PKG to retrieve the new private and public keys.
Assume that N signers are authorized to publish bun-
dles in the systems, this is tantamount to N commu-
nications - a reasonable assessment is than N is of the
order of magnitude of 10, or even less. When a client
loads a bundle, it can check locally that the key is valid
and has been issued by the trusted PKG. So no com-
munication with the PKG is required. The total num-
ber of communication with the Certificate Authority
is thus N. In the context of PKIs, the signers need to
certify their Public Key Certificates, which amounts to
N communications. When they load a new bundle, the
clients must check that this Public Key has not been
revoked. This is done through a request to the Certifi-
cation Authority, which provides a Certificate Revoca-
tion List (CRL). The number of client is noted M, with
M of the order of magnitude of a couple of million, if
we assume as in the Muse European Project that the
Home Gateway is provided with the ADSL modem (in
France, the number of client varies between 1 and 5
millions clients for each ADSL providers). On the first
hand, the PKG must stand a traffic of some tens of
connections daily. On the other hand, the PKI must
be available for several millions of users. If the PKI is
replicated on the DSLAMs, each replica serves no more
than 400 clients, but all DSLAMs must support CRL
functionalities, which obviously causes an important
system update overhead. Identity-based Key Manage-
ment systems therefore has a radical technical advan-
tage over PKIs, which could soon be translated in rad-
ical financial gains for telecommunications firms.
Since we have developed prototypes for both DSA-
based digital signature and Identity-based systems, it
would be of interest to compare the relative computa-
tion speed of both techniques. However, the Bundle
Digital signature we use is written using the Bouncy-
castle Java library for DSA-signature, and the Identity-
based Cryptographic C libraries are accessed from Java
code through native calls. Quantitative comparison
would be a comparison of C and Java more than an
evaluation of both techniques. We intend to perform
these evaluation as soon as a Java implementations of
Identity-based Cryptographic tools are available.
PKI and IB Cryptography have both pros and cons
what concerns cryptographic and system security prop-
erties. But the simplification in the key manage-
ment process with Identity-based systems, which allows
client to check digital signatures without any need to
contact a certification authority proves to allows dra-
matic key management gains, in particular in strongly
asymmetric systems such as telecommunication Home
Gateways.
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Table 1. Pros and Cons of classical PKI and
IB-PKI Approaches
5 Conclusion and Perspectives
We have proposed in this paper a protocol to secure
the deployment of OSGi bundles by using recent cryp-
tographic algorithms based on elliptic curves and bilin-
ear pairings. Our proposition relied on the CZK-IBS
scheme to support the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
instead of the classical solutions as those specified by
the OSGi Alliance. The use of Identity-based cryptog-
raphy has several advantages: first, the key manage-
ment overhead is greatly reduced, which can provide a
radical advantage in the case of strongly asymmetric
systems such as Home Gateway infrastructures, where
a couple of providers publish services for an important
number of clients. The public keys do not need to be
published, since they can be deduced from the identi-
fier of their owner. Moreover, the complex revocation
scheme vanishes and is replaced by the frequent update
of the keys, typically every day or week. Another ad-
vantage of our proposition which has probably a less
radical impact is the fact that the keys and signatures
used are based on Elliptic-curve cryptography. They
are therefore more compact than those bounded with
the DSA algorithm which is currently used for signing
archives. We have also defined in this paper the pro-
cess for securing the deployment of OSGi bundles using
Identity-based cryptography, as well as the structure of
a signed OSGi bundle by the CZK-IBS scheme. Both
qualitative and quantitative benefits of the approach
were discussed. Yet, our approach has some limita-
tions, in particular the centralization of the security
scheme around the PKG, which becomes a single point
of failure. Its compromission means a high impact on
the overall security of the system.
However, we believe that Identity-based Cryptog-
raphy enables to greatly reduce the key management
overhead, and thus may succeed in large scale systems
where PKI have so far proven to be very difficult to
manage.
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